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Combating Maritime Piracy:  
Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation 
and Information Sharing 
Yaron Gottlieb* 
In recent years, maritime piracy has reemerged as a 
serious threat to the international community, particularly 
following the significant increase in incidents of maritime piracy 
and armed robbery at sea that occurred off the coast of Somalia 
and in the Gulf of Guinea. As presented in this article, 
international cooperation is indispensable for combating piracy. 
To that end, the article argues that a duty to cooperate in the 
repression of piracy is moored in various international 
instruments—notably in Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—as well as in general principles 
of international law. It requires states to adhere to due diligence 
‘best efforts’ standards, which, in the context of maritime 
piracy, entail exercising sincere, concerted, and proactive 
efforts. The duty to cooperate should serve as a guiding 
principle in identifying the specific obligations imposed on 
states. Among those specific obligations is the duty to share 
relevant information that can assist in preventing piracy attacks 
and in facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates. It is further 
submitted that successful undertakings to fight maritime piracy 
necessitate inter-disciplinary cooperation, namely cooperation 
among entities whose expertise generally lies in different fields. 
The article further discusses the main challenges for information 
sharing and proposes solutions to meet those challenges. 
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I.  Introduction 
In recent years, maritime piracy has reemerged as a serious threat 
to the international community, notably following the significant 
increase in incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea 
that occurred off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea. As 
presented in this article, international cooperation is indispensable for 
combating piracy. To that end, this article argues that a duty to 
cooperate in the repression of piracy exists under international law. 
This duty, as articulated in Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should serve as a guiding principle in 
identifying the specific obligations imposed on states. Among these 
specific obligations is the duty to share relevant information that can 
assist in preventing piracy attacks and in facilitating prosecution of 
suspected pirates. It is further submitted that successful undertakings 
to fight maritime piracy necessitate inter-disciplinary cooperation, 
namely cooperation among entities with expertise in different fields. 
This article further discusses the main challenges associated with 
information sharing, and it proposes solutions to meet them.  
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II.  Combating Maritime Piracy:  
The Duty to Cooperate 
A. The Primary Legal Sources Underlying the Duty to Cooperate 
Combating maritime piracy requires commitment and active 
engagement by states. As indicated by Mr. Helmut Tuerk, the 
honorable justice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
“[t]he practice of piracy has been widespread over the centuries and 
continues to be a menace. As a result, every State not only has a 
right, but also a duty, to take action to curb piratical activities.”1  
States are expected to take measures on both the domestic level—
for example, by criminalizing piratical acts2—and on the international 
level. The key element of the latter is international cooperation, 
whether directly among states or through the involvement of 
international organizations and other mechanisms created by states. 
Indeed, international instruments repeatedly refer to the 
importance of international cooperation in the repression of maritime 
piracy. Thus, for example, the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA 
Convention”) provides in Article 13 that state parties shall cooperate 
in the prevention of the offences defined by that convention.3 
 
1. Helmut Tuerk, Combating Terrorism at Sea—The Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 15 U. MIAMI 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337, 342 (2008). 
2. See S.C. Res. 1918, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010) 
(calling on “all States, including States in the region, to criminalize 
piracy under their domestic law”). The UNSC reiterated this call in 
later resolutions. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2077, para. 18, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2077 (Nov. 21, 2012) (reiterating the call on “all States to 
criminalize piracy under their domestic law”).  
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation art. 13, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter SUA 
Convention]. Though the SUA Convention does not use the term 
“piracy,” at least some of the offences listed in Article 3 of the 
Convention such as the seizure of a ship by force are undoubtedly 
applicable to piratical acts. See id. at 224. On the application of the 
SUA Convention in the fight against maritime piracy see, inter alia, 
Milena Sterio, Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia: The Argument for 
Pirate Prosecutions in the National Courts of Kenya, the Seychelles, 
and Mauritius, 4 AMSTERDAM L.F. 104, 121 (2012) (finding that “SUA 
may prove to be a more useful model for the prosecution of pirates than 
UNCLOS”); Cheah Wui Ling, Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance 
in the Prosecution of Serious Maritime Crimes: A Comparative and 
Critical Analysis of Applicable Frameworks 9–10, 13, HAGUE ACADEMY 
RESEARCH SERIES (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2259753 (“The 1988 SUA is particularly noteworthy because it 
addresses a number of cooperation issues that are encountered at sea.”).  
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Similarly, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in its series of 
resolutions related to the threats of piracy and armed robbery at sea 
off the coast of Somalia (and more recently in the Gulf of Guinea), 
urged all states to cooperate with each other and with international 
organizations in combating acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.4 
The importance of international and regional cooperation in this 
domain was also highlighted by the U.N. General Assembly in its 
resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea.5 
Notably, Article 100 of UNCLOS, titled “Duty to cooperate in the 
repression of piracy,” specifies that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the 
fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in 
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”6 
The duty to cooperate is at the core of the piracy section of 
UNCLOS. Indeed, it is the first provision of this section, thereby 
providing an appropriate benchmark as well as framework for the 
substantive provisions that follow. Moreover, while international 
cooperation is a common theme of UNCLOS,7 Article 100 is unique in 
two ways. First, it is the only provision in UNCLOS in which the title 
is the duty to cooperate.8 Secondly, it uses the strongest wording 
 
4. With regard to the situation in Somalia, see, for example, S.C. Res. 
1816, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). All UNSC 
resolutions that followed on this matter highlighted the importance of 
international cooperation. With regard to the situation in the Gulf of 
Guinea, see S.C. Res. 2018, paras. 4, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2018 (Oct. 31, 
2011); S.C. Res. 2039, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/2039 (Feb. 29, 2012). 
5. See G.A. Res. 63/111, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Dec. 5, 2008) 
(“[The General Assembly] [r]ecognizes the crucial role of international 
cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in 
combating, in accordance with international law, threats to maritime 
security, including piracy, armed robbery at sea . . . .”). The General 
Assembly reiterated this point in its annual resolutions on oceans and 
the law of the sea. See G.A. Res. 66/231, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/66/231 (Dec. 24, 2011); G.A. Res. 67/78, ¶ 88, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/67/78 (Dec. 11, 2012).  
6. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 100, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS].  
7. See YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 4 (2012) 
(explaining how international cooperation and spatial distribution of 
national jurisdiction are the two basic functions of UNCLOS). 
8. Compare with other cooperation-related sections or provisions in 
UNCLOS such as Section 2 (titled Global and Regional Co-operation) of 
Part XII (Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment) or 
Section 2 (titled “International Co-operation”) of Part XIII (Marine 
Scientific Research). The titles of those provisions do not make a 
specific reference to the “duty to cooperate.” UNCLOS, supra note 6, 
1833 U.N.T.S. at 479, 496. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Combating Maritime Piracy 
307 
found in UNCLOS with regard to this obligation; namely, that all 
states shall cooperate “to the fullest possible extent.”9 
Article 100 of UNCLOS contains the precise wording of Article 14 
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas (HSC),10 which in 
turn incorporated (again, verbatim) the corresponding article adopted 
by the International Law Commission (ILC) on the law of the sea.11 
All of these provisions went beyond the proposal put together in the 
scholarly work known as the Harvard Research Draft,12 which later 
served as the basis for the discussions of piracy by the ILC and the 
negotiations of the piracy provisions in the HSC. Article 18 of the 
Harvard Research Draft provided that “[t]he parties to this 
convention agree to make every expedient use of their powers to 
prevent piracy, separately and in co-operation.” The commentary to 
this provision underscored that Article 18 imposes on states only “a 
general discretionary obligation to discourage piracy by exercising 
their rights of prevention and punishment as far as is expedient.”13 By 
establishing a duty to cooperate, UNCLOS and the HSC therefore 
send a clearer message than originally foreseen in the proposal of the 
Harvard Research Draft.  
Both UNCLOS and HSC, however, did not set out the precise 
obligations that fall within the scope of the general duty to 
cooperate,14 thereby leaving this provision open to interpretation with 
 
9. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 100, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436 (emphasis 
added). Compare with the wording of other UNCLOS provisions 
mentioning that “States shall co-operate” (Articles 108 and 109) or 
“should co-operate” (Article 123) or even “may co-operate” (e.g., Article 
129). Other provisions provide that “States shall co-operate actively” 
(Article 273) or refer to cooperation “to the extent possible” (Article 
199). None of these therefore contain the clearest instruction on 
cooperation as prescribed by Article 100. Id. at 437–38, 443, 479, 505.  
10. Convention on the High Seas art. 14, opened for signature Apr. 29, 
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 
1962). 
11. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
11 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, art. 38, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), 
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, 282, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 [hereinafter 1956 ILC Report].  
12. Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy with 
Comments, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 741 (1932); MYRA WILLIAMSON, 
TERRORISM, WAR, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY OF THE USE 
OF FORCE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN IN 2001, at 95 (2009) (describing the 
Harvard Research Draft as seminal because it comprehensively discussed 
all angles of maritime piracy, which were later incorporated by the ILC 
and HSC).  
13. Harvard Research in Int’l Law, supra note 12, at 746, 760. 
14. Compare to other sections of UNCLOS that specify the various areas 
and means of cooperation such as Article 123 on cooperation of states 
bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, or Article 143 on collaboration 
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regard to the means that states should employ to sufficiently fulfill 
their obligation. At the very least, however, it is evident that inaction 
or failure to cooperate in response to piratical acts—where both the 
factual circumstances and the applicable legal framework allow for 
action and cooperation—cannot be reconciled with the duty as 
prescribed by Article 100. The ILC, in its above commentary, clearly 
stated that “[a]ny State having an opportunity of taking measures 
against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid 
upon it by international law.”15 Similarly, Mr. Jack Lang, the Special 
Adviser appointed by the U.N. Secretary General to address the legal 
issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, underscored that the 
degree of flexibility provided by the wording of Article 100 “should 
not be used as a pretext for failure to prosecute.”16 Professor Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, the honorable justice and former President of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, echoed this approach, 
stating that “a ship entitled to intervene in cases of piracy may not, 
without good justification, turn a blind eye to such acts.”17 Professor 
Wolfrum went a step further by asserting that “[t]urning a blind eye 
to the activities of pirates is in itself an act of piracy,”18 and by 
suggesting that states permitting piracy activities may be subject to 
countermeasures and also, theoretically, to an intervention by the 
UNSC.19  
B. Interpretation of the Duty to Cooperate: The Applicable Legal Test 
Notwithstanding UNCLOS’ shortcomings in failing to detail the 
specific obligations within the scope of the general duty to cooperate, 
certain conclusions can be reached regarding the nature of the duty, 
the applicable legal test, and the specific actions expected from states, 
such as the duty to share relevant information.20  
 
in the field of marine scientific research. UNCLOS, supra note 6, 1833 
U.N.T.S. at 443, 448. 
15. 1956 ILC Report, supra note 11, at 282.  
16. Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Annex Report to the Letter dated 
Jan. 24, 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011) (by Jack 
Lang). 
17. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and Limitations 
Under International Law, ITLOS 4, http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/ 
documents/statements_of_president/wolfrum/doherty_lectire_130406
_eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
18. Id. at 5.  
19. Id.  
20. See infra Part III and discussion on duty to share information. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Combating Maritime Piracy 
309 
In this respect, Article 100 should be interpreted broadly. This 
derives from the provision’s wording (duty to cooperate “to the fullest 
possible extent”) as well as from the underlying rationale of the piracy 
section of UNCLOS; namely, ensuring the international community’s 
common interest in protecting the freedom of navigation and safety of 
persons at sea.21  
Further, while Article 100 does not create an absolute obligation, 
its clear wording entails the existence of a presumption of cooperation 
in the face of piracy. This presumption also derives from the general 
principle of good faith in fulfilling treaty obligations, long recognized 
as “[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and 
performance of legal obligations, whatever their source . . . .”22 and 
explicitly mentioned in UNCLOS.23 Thus, a state that was in a 
position to act and failed to do so carries the burden of justifying—
based on factual, legal, or other grounds—its lack of action. 
For the purpose of assessing compliance with the duty to 
cooperate, this article proposes the application of the due diligence 
principle. This fundamental principle of international law24 was used 
as early as 1871,25 has been frequently applied in different fields such 
 
21. See DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 38 (2009) (stating that “the rule against piracy exists to protect the 
freedom of navigation and the safety of persons upon the high seas”). 
22. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, ¶ 49 (Dec. 20). 
With regard to performing treaty obligations in good faith see also 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon 
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). On 
the principle of good faith in the context of international cooperation, 
see Report of the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, 396, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), 
reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 155, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Report]. 
23. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 300, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516 (“States Parties 
shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention 
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this 
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of 
right.”). 
24. Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under 
International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 121 (2006) (quoting 
Luigi Condorelli, The Imputability to States of Acts of International 
Terrorism, 19 ISR. Y.B. H.R. 233, 240 (1989)).  
25. The 1871 Treaty of Washington mentioned due diligence in reference to 
the responsibility of a neutral state for damages caused by private 
individuals acting within its jurisdiction. See Treaty of Washington, 
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863, T.S. No. 133. A year 
later, the treaty and this concept were subject to an international 
arbitration (the Alabama Arbitration) between the U.S. and Great 
Britain over the alleged failure of Great Britain to fulfill its duty of 
neutrality during the American Civil War. See Alabama Claims of U.S. 
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as environmental law, as well as invoked by international tribunals in 
various cases.26 In some instances the principle has been mentioned in 
an international instrument,27 yet an explicit reference is not required 
as a precondition of utilizing it as the relevant standard. For example, 
in its commentary to the Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (“Draft Articles”), 
the ILC often refers to this concept, even though it is not expressly 
mentioned in the Draft Articles. Moreover, the ILC commentary to 
the Draft Articles concluded that “[a]n obligation of due diligence as 
the standard basis for the protection of the environment from harm 
can be deduced from a number of international conventions.”28 As an 
example of such a convention, the commentary mentions Article 
194(1) of UNCLOS (“Measures to prevent, reduce, and control 
pollution of the marine environment”), which does not expressly use 
the term due diligence.29 
The definition of this principle has been the subject of discussions 
from the very early days of its existence.30 Maria Flemme proposed to 
 
Against Great Britain (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 131 (Treaty 
of Washington Trib. Arb. 1872).  
26. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 
2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 101, 187 (Apr. 20) (calling for both parties to exercise 
due diligence when taking measures to preserve the ecological balance of 
the River Uruguay); Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, 
Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep. 10, 
¶¶ 110–20 [hereinafter Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory 
Opinion] (reiterating and explaining the principle of due diligence). 
27. For example, the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
provides in draft Article 7.1 (titled “Obligation not to cause significant 
harm”) that “[w]atercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize 
an international watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant 
harm to other watercourse States.” Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. 10, 
U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
1, 102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2). See also 
UNIDROIT, Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects, art. 4(1) (June 24, 1995) (stipulating that a possessor of a 
stolen cultural object has a right to restitution upon returning the 
object if he/she proves, inter alia, the exercise of due diligence when 
acquiring the object).  
28. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 154 (citing commentary to Article 3 
of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities).  
29. Id. at 154 n.880; UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 194, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 478. 
30. In the 1872 Alabama Arbitration, the parties to the dispute (the U.S. 
and Great Britain) presented different definitions of the due diligence 
concept as referred to in the 1871 Treaty of Washington. See Alabama 
Claims, 29 R.I.A.A. at 129 (holding that due diligence should be 
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view due diligence as signifying “the conduct to be expected of good 
government in order to effectively protect other States and the global 
environment.”31 She also suggested that the concept entails “a 
minimum level of efforts which a State must undertake to fulfil [sic] 
its international responsibilities.”32 In its commentary to Article 3 of 
the Draft Articles, the ILC defined a higher threshold than Flemme’s 
“minimum level of efforts,” namely that of “reasonable efforts.”33 
Elsewhere, it has been suggested that “the due diligence obligation 
requires the state’s best effort[s],”34 a position also reflected in the 
Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion by the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.35 
As indicated earlier in this article, UNCLOS uses the strongest 
wording when referring to the duty to cooperate in the repression of 
piracy (cooperation “to the fullest possible extent”). It is also 
noteworthy that among the factors to be considered when determining 
the applicable standard of due diligence are the specific risks 
generated by the case or activity at hand.36 In that regard, it is 
 
“exercised by neutral governments in exact proportion to the risks to 
which either . . . may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations 
of neutrality” after the parties in this suit presented different definitions 
of the concept as referred to in the 1871 Treaty of Washington). 
31. Maria Flemme, Due Diligence in International Law, at 12 (Spring 2004) 
(unpublished M. A. thesis) (on file with Lund University), available at 
http://www. lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24965&postid=1557482. 
32. Id. at 1. 
33. 2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 154 (“In the context of the present 
articles, due diligence is manifested in reasonable efforts by a State to 
inform itself of factual and legal components that relate foreseeably to a 
contemplated procedure and to take appropriate measures, in timely 
fashion, to address them.”). 
34. Barnidge, supra note 24, at 112 (quoting Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing 
the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of 
Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 371, 379 (1999)). 
35. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea concluded that “[t]he 
sponsoring State’s obligation ‘to ensure’” is “an obligation to deploy 
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to 
obtain this result.” Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion, 
supra note 26, ¶ 110 (emphasis added). 
36. On the link between the applicable standard of due diligence and the 
specific risks posed, see the Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 26, ¶ 117 (“The standard of due diligence has to be 
more severe for the riskier activities.”). See also the ILC commentary on 
its Draft Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, where it stated that 
“[t]he required degree of care is proportional to the degree of hazard 
involved.” 2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 155. 
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indisputable that piracy presents serious risks to the international 
community, as manifested, inter alia, by the unprecedented number 
of UNSC resolutions adopted on the matter in a relatively short 
period of time. Accordingly, in the counter-piracy field, the standard 
of due diligence should be higher than minimum or even reasonable 
efforts; rather, it should be based on the “best efforts” test. Stated 
differently, compliance with Article 100 of UNCLOS would require 
sincere, concerted, and proactive efforts to cooperate internationally 
in the repression of maritime piracy.  
As due diligence is a flexible concept,37 assessing its standard 
requires analysis of not only the particular field of law, but also of the 
specific obligation within the general duty to cooperate (such as the 
duty to share information). Additionally, there is a need to consider 
the facts and circumstances of each case. Indeed, the duty to 
cooperate prescribed by Article 100 of UNCLOS may entail different 
actions in different instances, also taking into consideration the tools 
and resources available to the state in question. Thus, the 
requirement for “sincere, concerted, and proactive efforts” should not 
be perceived as defining a uniform, specific set of actions applicable to 
all states in all situations. This conclusion corresponds to the position 
expressed by the ILC in its commentary on the duty to cooperate in 
combating piracy, which stated, “[o]bviously, the State must be 
allowed a certain latitude as to the measures it should take to this 
end in any individual case.”38 In addition, and similar to other fields 
where the due diligence principle has been applied, it is clear that the 
concept of due diligence implies an obligation of conduct, not of 
result.39 
 
37. See the ILC Commentary to Article 2 of its Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, whereby it is 
mentioned that standards such as due diligence “vary from one context 
to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose 
of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary 
obligation.” 2001 ILC Report, supra note 22, at 34. See also 
Responsibilities and Obligations Advisory Opinion, supra note 26, ¶ 117 
(“The content of ‘due diligence’ obligations may not easily be described 
in precise terms. Among the factors that make such a description 
difficult is the fact that ‘due diligence’ is a variable concept.”); Flemme, 
supra note 31, at 12 (“Flexibility is an essential characteristic of this 
standard of conduct . . . .”). 
38. 1956 ILC Report, supra note 11, at 282. 
39. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly, supra note 27, at 103 (“The obligation of due diligence 
contained in article 7 sets the threshold for lawful State activity. It is 
not intended to guarantee that in utilizing an international watercourse 
significant harm would not occur. It is an obligation of conduct, not an 
obligation of result.”). See also Responsibilities and Obligations 
Advisory Opinion, supra note 26, ¶ 110 (“The sponsoring State’s 
obligation ‘to ensure’ is not an obligation to achieve, in each and every 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Combating Maritime Piracy 
313 
C. Article 100 as the Guiding Principle in Identifying the Specific Duties 
Imposed on States 
A detailed listing and in-depth discussion of all the specific duties 
required pursuant to Article 100’s general obligation to cooperate 
exceeds the scope of this article. For the purpose of the current 
discussion, it is submitted that certain duties can be identified based 
on a holistic interpretation of the piracy section of UNCLOS, which is 
derived from a joint reading of Article 100 and the substantive 
provisions of the piracy section. Stated differently, UNCLOS’ piracy 
provisions should be interpreted and implemented in light of the 
general guideline—namely the duty to cooperate—prescribed by 
Article 100. 
Thus, for example, a key provision under UNCLOS is Article 105, 
which reads:  
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a 
ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, 
and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The 
courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide 
upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the 
action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, 
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.40 
Commentators have pointed to the hortatory characteristic of the 
provision, notably due to the use of the verb “may” throughout this 
article.41 It appears, however, that the use of the verb “may” does not 
 
case, the result that the sponsored contractor complies with the 
aforementioned obligations. Rather, it is an obligation to deploy 
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to 
obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in international 
law, this obligation may be characterized as an obligation ‘of conduct’ 
and not ‘of result’, and as an obligation of ‘due diligence.’” (emphasis 
added)).  
40. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 105, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437.  
41. GUILFOYLE, supra note 21, at 30–31 (“Under Article 105 of UNCLOS, 
any state may seize a pirate vessel and its courts may ‘decide upon the 
penalties to be imposed.’ This implies a permissive, not mandatory, 
grant of universal jurisdiction and a choice of means as to how to 
co-operate to suppress piracy.”); Tullio Treves, Piracy and the 
International Law of the Sea, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES 
AND RESPONSES 117, 122 (Douglas Guilfoyle ed., 2013) (“The language 
of article 105 (i.e., ‘may’) seems to indicate that the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the seizing state’s courts is a possibility, not an 
obligation, notwithstanding the ‘duty’ to cooperate in the repression of 
piracy set out in article 100.”); J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy Off 
Somalia: International Law and International Institutions, 104 AM. J. 
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imply the discretionary nature of the provision, but is rather meant to 
indicate that the concrete actions listed under Article 105 are allowed 
as an exception to the general principles that would otherwise forbid 
them.  
Accordingly, Article 105 permits the seizure of a pirate ship 
navigating on the high seas as an exception to the general principle of 
freedom of navigation on the high seas enshrined in UNCLOS,42 under 
which such an intervention would have been considered illegal. 
Similarly, Article 105 allows every state to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over pirates as an exception to the general principle 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the flag state.43  
Thus, through the use of the term “may,” Article 105 sanctions 
certain actions that would have otherwise been prohibited under 
international law. This interpretation of the term “may” also 
corresponds to the way it is used in other provisions in UNCLOS’ 
piracy section. An example of this is Article 107, which provides that 
“[a] seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships 
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that 
effect.”44 As manifested by the title of the provision (“Ships and 
aircraft which are entitled to seize on account of piracy”),45 the use of 
the term “may” in this article indicates which vessels or aircrafts are 
allowed to conduct the seizure, rather than whether states have the 
discretion or an obligation to carry out such acts.  
Consequently, the use of the term “may” in these provisions does 
not imply that a state has complete discretion over whether to act. 
Indeed, this is precisely where the link to Article 100 becomes 
relevant. If a state is in a position to seize a pirate ship or take other 
 
INT’L L. 397, 403 (2010) (“[Article 105], like all of the piracy provisions 
save Article 100, is discretionary—‘may’ . . . .”). 
42. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 87(1)(a), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 432. 
43. See id. art. 92(1), at 433 (“Ships shall sail under the flag of one State 
only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its 
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.”). See also M/V Saiga (No. 2) 
(St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1, 1999, 3 ITLOS 
Rep. 10, 48 (“[T]he ship, every thing on it, and every person involved or 
interested in its operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag 
State.”); Medvedyev v. France, Judgment of Mar. 29, 2010, para. 85 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/ 
pdf/001-97979?TID=ufyxypubrf (mentioning the principle of universal 
jurisdiction over piracy acts as an exception to the rule of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the flag state); TANAKA, supra note 7, at 152–55.  
44. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 107, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437 (emphasis 
added). 
45. Id. (emphasis added).  
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actions sanctioned by Article 105, and it nonetheless chooses not to 
act, for example, due to reasons of political convenience, it can 
certainly be argued that this state did not fulfill its obligations under 
international law. More specifically, it can be argued that the state 
failed to fulfill its obligation to cooperate in the suppression of piracy 
under Article 100.46 To be clear, the combination of Articles 100 and 
105 does not create an obligation to seize a pirate ship under all 
circumstances. Yet the state concerned should present a sound 
explanation for its lack of action in light of the presumption of 
cooperation and the due diligence standard created by Article 100. To 
that end, an attempt to rely on the term “may” in Article 105 as 
allegedly pointing to the hortatory nature of the provision does not 
appear to be convincing and might put into question the state’s good 
faith in raising such an argument.  
Article 100 can further serve as a benchmark to construe the 
piracy provisions in case a doubt arises on the appropriate 
interpretation. One example already mentioned in the literature on 
piracy concerns the practice of naval forces operating off the coast of 
Somalia to hand over suspected pirates to regional states such as 
Kenya to face trial. Article 105 provides neither explicit authority to 
do so, nor does it expressly prohibit such cooperation between the 
arresting state and the prosecuting one. In response to the argument 
that in accordance with Article 105 only the arresting state has 
jurisdiction to try the pirate,47 it has been correctly contended that 
such an argument “is inconsistent with the strong duty of cooperation 
 
46. A similar position (though without explicitly referring to a violation of a 
duty under international law) can be found in Professor Wolfrum’s 
discussion of Article 107 of UNCLOS, where he stated that “[i]t has to 
be acknowledged that the central provision, namely article 107 of the 
Convention, is worded as an option for States to take up rather than as 
an obligation incumbent upon them. However, States are under an 
obligation to cooperate in the repression of piracy (article 100 of the 
Convention). Reading article 100 and 107 of the Convention together, it 
can be argued that States may not lightly decline to intervene against 
acts of piracy.” Wolfrum, supra note 17, at 3–4. A different position was 
expressed by John Kavanagh, who argued that “a state’s 
non-compliance with the provision [Article 100] would not constitute a 
breach of international law. In other words, a state could avoid the 
prosecution of a pirate who is within its jurisdiction or avoid the 
enactment of legislation to provide for prosecution.” John Kavanagh, 
The Law of Contemporary Sea Piracy, 1999 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 127, 140–
41 (referring to BARRY H. DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA 
PIRACY 108 (1980)). 
47. See Eugene Kontorovich, United States v. Shi. 525 F.3d 709, Cert. 
Denied, 129 S.Ct. 324 (2008) United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, April 24, 2008, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (2009) 
(noting that transfer might be illegal under UNCLOS because it only 
allows capturing nations to prosecute pirates). 
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in the international law of piracy articulated by Article 100. The 
practice of states reflected in their arrangements with Kenya indicates 
that they believe cooperation includes transfers ashore to third states 
for trial and that they are permitted under international law.”48  
Finally, Article 100 can also be invoked to support counter-piracy 
initiatives in accordance with states’ national legislation. For example, 
it has been reported that the Netherlands uses this provision as the 
legal basis for its authorization of Vessel Protection Detachments 
(VPDs) on Dutch ships under its Constitution.49 
III.  The Duty to Share Information as a Specific 
Obligation Under the General  
Duty to Cooperate 
The concrete measures to be applied by states as part of their 
general duty to cooperate are determined based on the characteristics 
of the particular threat and the circumstances of each case. Whatever 
the specific measures are, however, there should be little doubt that 
 
48. Roach, supra note 41, at 404 (countering Eugene Kontorovich’s position 
that expresses a more restricted reading of Article 105). A conclusion 
similar to that of Roach—though without basing it on Article 100—was 
presented by Lawrence Azubuike, who also countered Kontorovich’s 
position by arguing that “[n]othing on the face of the Article [105] 
makes the jurisdiction exclusive to the arresting State.” Lawrence 
Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 54–55 (2009). An opinion similar to that of 
Kontorovich was presented by Joseph M. Isanga. To support their 
position, both Kontorovich and Isanga pointed to the commentary to 
Article 43 of the ILC Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea (which is 
the equivalent to Article 105 of UNCLOS). See Joseph M. Isanga, 
Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea Piracy: Expanding 
Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2010) (finding 
that UNCLOS does not extend universal jurisdiction to cases involving 
extradition). The ILC commentary reads: “This article gives any State 
the right to seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have 
them adjudicated upon by its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a 
place under the jurisdiction of another State.” 1956 ILC Report, supra 
note 11, at 283. As indicated, this author supports the position 
expressed by Roach and Azubuike in light of the importance attached to 
international cooperation in combating piracy as provided for by 
Article 100 of UNCLOS. A conclusion supporting broad interpretation 
of Article 105 (and the rest of the piracy provisions) can also be deduced 
from the object and purpose of the piracy section of UNCLOS, namely 
the common interest of the international community in ensuring the 
freedom of navigation and the safety of persons and property upon the 
high seas. 
49. See Clive R. Symmons, Embarking Vessel Protection Detachments and 
Private Armed Guards on Board Commercial Vessels: International 
Legal Consequences and Problems Under the Law of the Sea, 51 MIL. L. 
& L. WAR REV. 21, 33 n.51 (2012). 
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information exchange is vital to ensure successful international 
cooperation in counter-piracy operations.  
Indeed, the duty to share information can be identified as a 
particular obligation within the general duty to cooperate. This 
conclusion is supported by relevant international instruments. For 
example, the SUA Convention provides that “States Parties shall 
co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 3, 
particularly by . . . exchanging information in accordance with their 
national law . . . .”50 
As explained by Justice Tuerk in reference to that provision: 
“there is a duty for States Parties that have a reason to believe that 
an offense set forth in the [SUA] Convention will be committed to 
furnish as promptly as possible any relevant information to those 
States having established jurisdiction over such offenses.”51 
In addition, the UNSC resolutions related to the suppression of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea also urge all states to share 
information on acts related to piracy and armed robbery at sea.52 The 
U.N. General Assembly has also emphasized the importance of 
information sharing as part of international cooperation in addressing 
the problem of piracy.53  
On the regional level, the need for information sharing as a means 
of promoting cooperation in the suppression of piracy was a prime 
motivator for Asian states in adopting the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 
 
50. SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.1(b), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230–31. 
51. Tuerk, supra note 1, at 349. 
52. See S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4, ¶ 3 (“Urg[ing] all States to cooperate 
with each other . . . and share information about, acts of piracy and 
armed robbery in the territorial waters and on the high seas off the 
coast of Somalia . . . .”). The UNSC reiterated the importance of 
sharing information in other resolutions as well. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 
1846, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1976, 
para. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011). In more recent 
Resolutions, the UNSC explicitly highlighted the importance of sharing 
evidence and information among states and international organizations 
for anti-piracy law enforcement purposes including with regard to the 
key figures of the criminal networks involved in piracy. See, e.g., 
S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 2, ¶ 9. 
53. See G.A. Res. 63/111, supra note 5, ¶ 61 (“[The General Assembly] 
[r]ecognizes the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, 
regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance 
with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy, 
armed robbery at sea . . . through . . . the enhanced sharing of 
information among States relevant to the detection, prevention and 
suppression of such threats . . . .”). See also G.A. Res. 66/231, supra 
note 5, ¶ 81; G.A. Res. 67/78, supra note 5, ¶ 88. 
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in Asia (ReCAAP).54 A key feature of ReCAAP is the creation of an 
information sharing center, based in Singapore, whose role is to 
undertake the collection, collation, and analysis of information 
received from state parties and to ensure a flow of information 
between them.55 Similarly, the more recent sub-regional Codes of 
Conduct, adopted in 2009 in Djibouti56 and in 2013 in Cameroon,57 
both inspired by ReCAAP,58 each provide that cooperation among the 
state parties shall include “sharing and reporting relevant 
information.”59 The Codes of Conduct further provide for detailed 
obligations related to information sharing, such as the need to 
designate a national focal point to facilitate coordinated, timely, and 
effective flow of information.60  
The duty to exchange information related to the prevention and 
suppression of maritime piracy may also derive independently from 
the abovementioned principle of due diligence. This concept entails, 
inter alia, that states have a responsibility to forewarn other countries 
about potential threats by communicating relevant information and 
updating international police databases in a systematic and 
comprehensive fashion.61 The “responsibility to forewarn” is not a new 
 
54. NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 242 
(Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2011). 
55. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia art. 7, Nov. 11, 2004, 2398 U.N.T.S. 199 
(entered into force Sept. 4, 2006); KLEIN, supra note 54, at 242−43. 
56. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression 
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti Meeting Res. 1 (Jan. 29, 2009) 
[hereinafter Djibouti Code of Conduct], available at http://www.imo. 
org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf. 
57. Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] et al., Code of 
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against 
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (June 
25, 2013) [hereinafter Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct], available at 
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/maritime_security/code_of_co
nduct.pdf. 
58. See Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 56, pmbl. The Gulf of Guinea 
Code of Conduct was in turn, inspired by the Djibouti Code of Conduct. 
See Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, supra note 57, pmbl.  
59. Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 56, art. 2(1); Gulf of Guinea Code 
of Conduct, supra note 57, art. 2(1).  
60. See Djbouti Code of Conduct, supra note 56, art. 8 (“Coordination and 
Information Sharing”); see Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, supra note 
57, art 11 (same). 
61. See RUTSEL SILVESTRE J. MARTHA, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERPOL 26−28 (2010); see also Ronald K. Nobel, INTERPOL 
Secretary General, Prosecuting Terrorism: The Global Challenge, 
Keynote Address Organized by NYU Center on Law & Security (June 4, 
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notion under international law. For example, in the Corfu Channel 
case, the International Court of Justice pointed to the duty of states 
to notify and warn countries of an imminent danger based on certain 
general and well-recognized principles such as elementary 
considerations of humanity.62  
With the Corfu Channel case in mind,63 the obligation to forewarn 
was introduced into UNCLOS, where it is provided in Article 24(2) 
that “[t]he coastal State shall give appropriate publicity to any danger 
to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea.”64 
It would be reasonable to contend that activities of a piratical nature 
pose a “danger to navigation” within the meaning of Article 24(2), 
thereby requiring the coastal state to warn other states of such known 
activity in its territorial waters. Beyond the territorial sea, the duty 
to forewarn is a corollary obligation of the duty to cooperate 
enshrined in Article 100 of UNCLOS, and by other relevant 
instruments, such as the SUA Convention and the abovementioned 
UNSC resolutions.  
IV.  The Nature of Cooperation: A Call for Holistic 
Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation 
Having established the existence of a general duty to cooperate 
and to share information, consideration should be given to the nature 
of the required cooperation in combating maritime piracy. Specifically, 
this article proposes a departure from the traditional concepts related 
to crime prevention in favor of adopting a holistic, inter-disciplinary 
paradigm for cooperation.  
 
2004), available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/ 
SG20040604.asp (“Countries have a responsibility to forewarn other 
countries about individuals that present a potential threat. . . . The 
practical implication is that countries have to ensure that they 
communicate all potentially relevant information to other countries and 
update international police databases in a systematic and comprehensive 
fashion.”). In the context of combating terrorism, the duty to forewarn 
of imminent threats was underscored by the UNSC in Resolution 1373, 
where the USNC, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
decided that all states shall “[t]ake the necessary steps to prevent the 
commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to 
other States by exchange of information.” S.C. Res. 1373, para. 2(b), 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
62. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); 
MARTHA, supra note 61, at 27. 
63. See TANAKA, supra note 7, at 96 (stating that Article 24(2) of UNCLOS 
incorporated the dictum from the Corfu Channel case regarding the 
duty to warn). 
64. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 24(2), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407. 
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Traditionally, governmental authorities and international entities 
operating in different fields have carried out their missions virtually 
independently of each other: the police engage in purely police work, 
the military engage in purely military operations, and so on. In 
addition, the level of cooperation between such bodies and the private 
sector has frequently been insignificant, if not practically non-existent.  
This traditional paradigm may work effectively when combating 
classic forms of crime such as land-based murder, robbery, and theft. 
Nonetheless, the challenges that have accompanied relatively new 
forms of crime such as terrorism, or the “resurrection” of old crimes 
such as maritime piracy, have highlighted the shortcomings of this 
conventional approach.  
This shift in the risks posed to our societies necessitates 
adjustment on two levels. First, substantive changes are necessary, 
namely with regard to the type of tasks carried out by each actor. 
Thus, for example, military forces might be requested to engage in 
activities of a law enforcement nature, and police forces might be 
asked to investigate illegal activities which, in the past, have not been 
considered “typical” ordinary law crimes in the strict sense of that 
term.  
Second, and stemming also from these substantive changes, 
institutional—or, more precisely, inter-institutional—adjustments are 
required. Concretely, there is a need to involve all relevant actors in 
this process—hence, the call for a holistic approach—and to establish 
cooperation among agencies and institutions whose role, mandate, and 
general activities may often be significantly different from one 
another. Enabling and coordinating the interaction between such 
bodies, namely inter-disciplinary cooperation, is not only desirable, 
but is in fact imperative.  
The “holistic inter-disciplinary cooperation” paradigm is of 
particular relevance in the field of maritime piracy. Despite the fact 
that piracy is a classic crime, its geographic location requires the 
involvement of naval forces. In addition, the shipping industry is often 
in possession of valuable information that can be used for criminal 
investigations and prosecutions. Thus, there is clearly a need to 
establish collaboration among navies, law enforcement agencies, and 
the private sector. As will be discussed in the next section, such 
collaboration is not without challenges, yet it remains essential to 
successful counter-piracy undertakings.  
V.  Challenges in Sharing Information in the Fight 
Against Piracy 
Sharing relevant information among states and international 
organizations is vital for combating piracy and should therefore be 
applied as the general standard procedure. Information exchange 
nonetheless faces a number of difficulties that will be addressed below.  
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A. Scope of the Duty to Share Information and the  
“National Security” Exception  
Frequently, the international instruments applicable to the 
suppression of piracy do not shed much light on the precise scope of 
the duty to share information. As already noted in this article, the 
duty to share information in reference to piracy is not explicitly 
mentioned in Article 100 of UNCLOS (or elsewhere in the piracy 
section).65 In the SUA Convention, the need to share information is 
mentioned, yet without further details.66  
Consequently, states are left to decide what precise information 
should be shared, how it is to be transmitted, and when it is to be 
delivered.67 Moreover, even when more detail on the duty to share 
information is provided, restrictions are often imposed due to national 
security, sovereignty, or commercial confidentiality concerns.68 Such 
restrictions are found in the SUA Convention (exchange of 
information “in accordance with national law”69), as well as in 
Article 302 of UNCLOS, a general provision concerning the disclosure 
of information: “[N]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to 
require a State Party, in the fulfilment of its obligations under this 
Convention, to supply information the disclosure of which is contrary 
to the essential interests of its security.”70 
These restrictions—in particular, those based on the “national 
security” argument—can be used by states to justify their decision 
not to share information.71 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the 
implementation of laws and regulations that prevent or restrict the 
exchange of information should be done only as an exception to the 
general obligation to share information deriving from Article 100 and 
the due diligence principle. Thus, if a state possesses relevant data, 
 
65. Compare id. art. 100, at 436, with id. art. 200, at 480 (according to 
which states shall cooperate through the exchange of information and 
data acquired about pollution of the marine environment). 
66. See SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230–31 
(“State Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set 
forth in article 3, particularly by . . . exchanging information in 
accordance with their national law, and co-ordinating administrative 
and other measures taken as appropriate to prevent the commission of 
offences set forth in article 3.”). 
67. See KLEIN, supra note 54, at 255 (finding that in the law enforcement 
context, states often agree to no more than a duty to cooperate, leaving 
the specifics of the duty to states’ discretion).  
68. Id. at 255–56. 
69. SUA Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(b), 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230–31. 
70. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 302, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516. 
71. See KLEIN, supra note 54, at 254 (mentioning the problem of national 
security interests trumping international security interests). 
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and it neglects—or even refuses—to share it, it carries the burden of 
justifying such a position. 
This approach is grounded in the wording of provisions such as 
the abovementioned Article 302 of UNCLOS, which allows 
non-disclosure of information only for purposes of protecting 
“essential interests of [state] security.”72 It is further based on the 
fundamental principle under international law requiring states to 
fulfill their obligations in good faith. Indeed, if, as a matter of policy, 
a state refrains from sharing information related to the prevention 
and suppression of maritime piracy, it can hardly be argued that it 
fulfills its obligation to cooperate in good faith.  
This conclusion is further supported by the nature of piracy as, in 
essence, an ordinary law crime. Accordingly, the type of information 
whose sharing is of importance for the purpose of combating maritime 
piracy would typically be that which is exchanged as a standard 
procedure among law enforcement authorities when countering crime: 
identification of suspects, modus operandi, etc. Thus, in general, the 
sharing of such information between the entities involved in 
counter-piracy operations (whether the navies or law enforcement 
agencies) is unlikely to compromise national security. It should 
therefore not be surprising that at least among law enforcement 
agencies and based on INTERPOL’s practice following the creation of 
its Global Maritime Piracy Database,73 in the domain of maritime 
piracy, very few restrictions have been imposed by INTERPOL’s 
member countries on information exchanged via the INTERPOL 
information system.74 As described in the next section, however, the 
 
72. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 302, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 516 (emphasis 
added). 
73. INTERPOL’s Global Piracy Database was created in 2011 and was 
mentioned in UNSC Resolutions such as Resolution 2020. S.C. Res. 
2020, para. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011) (“[The Security 
Council] [c]ommends INTERPOL for the creation of a global piracy 
database designed to consolidate information about piracy off the coast 
of Somalia and facilitate the development of actionable analysis for law 
enforcement, and urges all States to share such information with 
INTERPOL for use in the database, through appropriate channels.”). 
As of July 2013, the database contains information on piracy events, 
pirates’ weapons, bank accounts, suspected financiers, negotiators, and 
more. For further information on the database, see Pierre St. Hilaire, 
Somali Piracy: Following the Paper Trail 6–7 n.4 (June 2012) (on file 
with the United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy Conference), available at 
http://www.counterpiracy.ae/2012-briefing-papers.  
74. In accordance with INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of Data 
(RPD), the source of data that circulated via INTERPOL’s channels 
retains control over its data. INTERPOL, Rules on the Processing of 
Data, art. 7(1), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/ 
dataprotection/tpd_documents/R%C3%A8glement%20INTERPOL_en.
pdf. This includes, inter alia, the right to impose restrictions on the 
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flow of information between the navies and law enforcement entities is 
not without difficulties.  
B. Challenges Deriving from the Nature of the Crime and the Entities 
Involved in Counter-Piracy Operations 
1. Navies carrying out law enforcement activities  
Since piracy takes place on the high seas, and often very far from 
the shore, combating piratical acts requires more than the typical 
police-prosecution cooperation, which is predominant in land-based 
ordinary law crimes such as theft or robbery. Notably, it calls for the 
involvement of navies as the front-line entities that both prevent 
attacks and gather relevant information to facilitate prosecution. In 
fact, in such operations, the navies exercise activities of a law 
enforcement nature. This unique feature in combating maritime 
piracy creates certain problems including those related to information 
exchange.  
The lead role taken by navies in combating piracy has also led the 
international community to overlook the role of law enforcement 
organizations and agencies, particularly during the early stages of 
combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. Thus, despite the fact that 
by the end of 2008 a shift towards a law enforcement paradigm was 
already underway,75 it was not until late November 2010 that the 
UNSC—already in its eleventh resolution related to piracy off the 
coast of Somalia76—made a clear reference to organizations such as 
INTERPOL and Europol operating in the counter-piracy field.  
In Resolution 1950, the UNSC underlined the importance of 
continuing to enhance the collection, preservation, and transmission of 
evidence of acts of piracy to competent authorities; welcomed the 
 
access or the use of such data by other users of the system, namely by 
other countries or international entities. Id. arts. 7(1), 58.  
75. Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia and Counter-Piracy Efforts, in 
MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 41, 35, 
50–51.  
76. The first UNSC Resolution making a reference to the threats posed by 
maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia was UNSC Resolution 1676. 
See S.C. Res. 1676, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1676 (May 10, 2006). The UNSC 
reiterated its concerns over piratical incidents in Resolution 1772. See 
S.C. Res. 1772, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1772 (Aug. 20, 2007); S.C. Res. 1801, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1801 (Feb. 20, 2008). The first time the UNSC 
addressed piracy off the coast of Somalia as the primary subject matter 
of a resolution was in June 2008, when it adopted Resolution 1816. See 
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 4. That resolution was followed by the 
following resolutions adopted by November 2010: S.C. Res 1838, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 52; S.C. Res. 
1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008), S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); and S.C. Res. 1918, supra note 2. 
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ongoing work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on 
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy; and urged states, 
in cooperation with INTERPOL and Europol, to further investigate 
international criminal networks involved in piracy off the coast of 
Somalia, including those responsible for illicit financing and 
facilitation.77 This rather late inclusion of the law enforcement angle 
in UNSC resolutions (and elsewhere) was particularly surprising, 
given that the guidelines for involving police forces in combating 
maritime piracy had already been put in place when the situation off 
the coast of Somalia began to deteriorate.78  
By not considering the potential in engaging the law enforcement 
community, a number of difficulties have emerged, particularly with 
regard to facilitating the prosecution of pirates, a task that typically 
falls within the expertise of law enforcement agencies. Naval forces do 
not necessarily have the tools or the expertise to gather and preserve 
the relevant evidence necessary for criminal proceedings.79 In addition, 
they generally do not have criminal databases where important data 
such as personal information on suspects, fingerprints, and DNA can 
be stored and compared with existing data. Such expertise and tools 
are at the core of law enforcement activities and international police 
cooperation. The relative lack of involvement of the police in those 
early stages therefore created a gap, or a “missing link,” between the 
navies operating off the coast of Somalia and the prosecution services.  
The growing recognition of the need to engage all relevant actors, 
including the law enforcement community, as part of the holistic 
interdisciplinary paradigm, led to welcome changes in the mindset 
that guided the international community in the early stages of 
combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.  
Thus, in addition to the abovementioned UNSC Resolution 1950, 
three noteworthy examples of the positive shift in approach are found 
in the following instruments. First, in UNSC Resolution 1976, the 
 
77. See S.C. Res. 1950, para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010). 
78. See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practice for the 
Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 922 (22) (Nov. 29, 2001). Among the 
points included in that Code were the following: involve relevant 
organizations (e.g., INTERPOL) at an early stage; evidence 
accumulated from different cases may create opportunities to identify 
offenders; appropriate databases should be searched; and contacting 
INTERPOL for information on the offenders (e.g., prior convictions) is 
important. Id. ¶¶ 5.6, 7.16. 
79. See Håkan Friman & Jens Lindborg, Initiating Criminal Proceedings 
with Military Force: Some Legal Aspects of Policing Somali Pirates by 
Navies, in MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra 
note 41, at 172, 195.  
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UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter: (1) invited 
states, individually or in cooperation with regional organizations, 
UNODC, and INTERPOL, to examine domestic procedures for the 
preservation of evidence and assist Somalia and other states in the 
region in strengthening their counter-piracy law enforcement 
capacities; (2) underlined the importance of continuing to enhance the 
collection, preservation, and transmission of evidence to competent 
authorities; and (3) urged states and international organizations to 
share evidence and information for anti-piracy law enforcement 
purposes with a view to ensuring effective prosecution.80 UNSC 
Resolution 2020 further highlighted the importance of sharing 
information with INTERPOL and Europol, including for the purposes 
of investigating those responsible for illicit financing and facilitation.81 
The second example is the amendment to the 2008 European 
Union Council Decision on Operation Atalanta, which is the 
European Union military operation off the coast of Somalia. The 
amended framework explicitly instructs Operation Atalanta to: 
(1) collect data including characteristics likely to assist in 
identification of piracy suspects such as fingerprints; and (2) circulate, 
via INTERPOL’s channels, and check against INTERPOL’s 
databases, personal data concerning suspects, including fingerprints 
and other identifiers (e.g., name, DOB, etc.).82 
A third example concerns the updates introduced in the fourth 
version of the Best Management Practices for Protection Against 
Somalia Based Piracy (BMP4). In the BMP4, produced and 
supported by a number of prominent players in the civil industry and 
naval forces, a specific chapter was added on cooperation with law 
enforcement authorities.83  
These three examples illustrate a positive shift in the strategic 
view of counter-piracy undertakings. Yet, certain complexities related 
to the exchange of information between navies and law enforcement 
entities had to be addressed. First, as a matter of normal procedure, 
navies tend to designate the data they collect as “classified 
information.” This poses serious impediments with regard to the use 
of such data for the purpose of prosecution on the national level, as 
well as in the context of international collaboration with entities 
(i.e., countries or international organizations) that generally do not 
 
80. S.C. Res. 1976, supra note 52, ¶¶ 16, 18, 19. 
81. S.C. Res. 2020, supra note 73, ¶ 18. 
82. See Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP, art. 1, 2010 O.J. (L 327) 49, 50 
(EU). 
83. BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST 
SOMALI BASED PIRACY, § 12 (2011) [hereinafter BMP4], available at 
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_5 
_2011.pdf (referring to the section titled “Post Incident Reporting”).  
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have access to classified information. As an example from 
INTERPOL’s practice, this issue had to be addressed during the 
discussions that led to the conclusion of a pilot agreement on 
information sharing between NATO and INTERPOL.84  
To address this concern, it is submitted that while the 
implementation of classified information rules is justified in the 
operations of navies during wartime or in preparation for military 
activities, a different approach should govern the operations of naval 
forces when carrying out missions of a law enforcement nature such as 
counter-piracy activities. Thus, applying standard navy classification 
procedures in this context, and consequently withholding from 
law-enforcement agencies important information such as fingerprints 
of suspected pirates, can hardly serve the original purpose of classified 
information. Further, it does not correspond to the general obligation 
to share information in combating maritime piracy. Piracy-related 
information either should not be designated as “classified information” 
in the first place, or it should be declassified as standard procedure. 
Sharing information in the other direction, specifically from law 
enforcement entities to the navies, also posed certain challenges. For 
example, in the context of INTERPOL’s work, a question arose 
whether INTERPOL may cooperate with navies considering Article 3 
of its Constitution, according to which “[i]t is strictly forbidden for 
the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a 
political, military, religious or racial character.”85 A plain reading of 
this provision could have led to the conclusion that INTERPOL must 
not share any information with the navies or organizations that 
operate off the coast of Somalia, such as NATO. INTERPOL 
nonetheless concluded that as long as the purpose and nature of the 
collaboration is confined to promoting international police 
cooperation, Article 3 does not prevent it from doing so.86 Based on 
 
84. See INTERPOL and NATO Cooperation Set to Boost Global Efforts 
Against Maritime Piracy, INTERPOL (Oct. 6, 2012), 
http://www.interpol.int/en/Internet/News-and-media/News-media-
releases/2012/N20121006. INTERPOL also provided specialized training 
for the crew of naval vessels ahead of their deployment under the NATO 
anti-piracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield. See INTERPOL Training 
Supports NATO Anti-Piracy Mission, INTERPOL (Oct. 12, 2013), 
http://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-media/News-media-releases/ 
2013/N20131012/. 
85. INTERPOL, Constit. art. 3 (June 13, 1956), available at http://www. 
interpol.int/About-INTERPOL/Legal-materials/The-Constitution.  
86. For further discussion of Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution and 
specifically on the application of the “purpose and nature” test in the 
field of maritime piracy, see Yaron Gottlieb, Article 3 of INTERPOLS’s 
Constitution: Balancing International Police Cooperation with the 
Prohibition on Engaging in Political, Military, Religious, or Racial 
Activities, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 135, 183–84 (2011). 
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this functional interpretation of Article 3, which permits in principle 
the flow of data from INTERPOL to the naval forces,87 INTERPOL 
shared information with the navies deployed in the Indian Ocean, 
such as a photo album of suspected pirates. The information 
contained in the photo album, gathered by INTERPOL from its 
member countries, can assist the navies in identifying Somali pirates, 
and it can potentially support a decision by the navy to detain 
suspects pending further investigations.88  
2. Interaction with the shipping industry 
Another important player in the fight against maritime piracy is 
the private sector, including ship owners, operators, and insurance 
companies.89 The role of shipping companies is particularly important 
in the field of sharing information, since they have access to crucial 
data and are also in a position to enable the collection of evidence by 
the police. 
Nonetheless, cooperation and information sharing between the 
private sector and law enforcement bodies has not been seamless. 
First, the shipping industry had to be sensitized to the importance of 
post-incident reporting, preserving the crime scene for the purpose of 
evidence gathering, and facilitating interviews with the crew of 
hijacked ships.90 Thus, despite existing guidelines, it was not 
uncommon to have cases where ships were thoroughly cleaned by 
their crews immediately upon their release by the pirates and prior to 
any law enforcement engagement, thereby destroying any potential 
 
87. A decision on sharing such information must also be taken in conformity 
with all INTERPOL’s rules, notably with the RPD.  
88. See Greece to Prosecute First Maritime Piracy Case with Evidence 
Gathered by INTERPOL Team, INTERPOL (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.interpol.int/fr/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/ 
PR098. 
89. St. Hilaire, supra note 73, at 2–3.  
90. BMP4, supra note 83, § 12. See also IMO, supra note 78, ¶¶ 6.7–6.9 
(discussing the securing of evidence); S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 2, 
pmbl. (underlining “the importance of continuing to enhance the 
collection, preservation and transmission to competent authorities of 
evidence of acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia”). The UNSC further welcomed “the ongoing work of the IMO, 
INTERPOL, and industry groups to develop guidance to seafarers on 
preservation of crime scenes following acts of piracy, and noting the 
importance for the successful prosecution of acts of piracy of enabling 
seafarers to give evidence in criminal proceedings.” S.C. Res. 2077, 
supra, note 2. In that resolution, the UNSC further urged states “to 
make their citizens and vessels available for forensic investigation as 
appropriate at the first suitable port of call immediately following an act 
or attempted act of piracy or armed robbery at sea or release from 
captivity.” Id. ¶ 29. 
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crime scene investigation. Direct collaboration with shipping 
companies proved that this hurdle can be overcome. For example, 
following the release of the hijacked oil tanker Irene SL in April 2011, 
INTERPOL immediately dispatched to the vessel an Incident 
Response Team (IRT). The IRT, supported by the South African 
Police Service, and in coordination with European Union Naval Force 
(EU NAVFOR) and INTERTANKO, gathered evidence which later 
served to assist Greece in its first prosecution of a piracy case.91 This 
successful deployment paved the way for similar INTERPOL-led 
IRTs, where crime scene evidence was collected and hostages were 
debriefed following their release.92 In July 2013, INTERPOL also 
carried out its first IRT mission on a ship that was attacked by 
pirates operating in the Gulf of Guinea. 
An additional difficulty concerns the trust gap between the 
shipping industry and other entities, notably governmental authorities 
such as navies and law enforcement agencies. This obstacle to 
information sharing has been particularly relevant in reference to 
ransom payments. Typically, negotiations over ransom payments are 
conducted directly between the pirates or their representatives and 
the shipping company or its representatives.93 In the context of such 
negotiations, information of relevance for future investigation and 
prosecution might be obtained, including names of negotiators and 
phone numbers. Frequently, however, the shipping company 
concerned has been hesitant to share such information with 
governmental authorities. This may derive from an assessment that 
the information may be business sensitive; an assumption that sharing 
information might frustrate the on-going (or future) negotiations; or 
even a fear of potential criminal proceedings against the 
representatives of the shipping industry in countries where paying 
ransom to pirates is criminalized. Overcoming this trust gap enabled 
the population of international criminal databases with relevant 
information to be used for future analytical reports and potential 
prosecution of pirates’ kingpins. To maintain the positive momentum, 
it is important that the private sector receive feedback on the 
information it provides to governmental authorities so that it can 
appreciate the effects of its collaboration. 
 
91. See Greece to Prosecute First Maritime Piracy Case with Evidence 
Gathered by INTERPOL Team, supra note 88.  
92. As of July 2013, INTERPOL has carried out six more IRTs following 
the release of ships hijacked by Somali pirates.  
93. See Vivienne Walt, Why the Somali Pirates Keep Getting Their 
Ransoms, TIME (Apr. 20, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/world/ 
article/0,8599,1892366,00.html (noting how shipping companies 
routinely conduct the negotiations with pirates and pay ransom sums). 
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C. The Proliferation of Information Networks and Its Discontents 
One of the marked developments on the international level in 
recent decades is the proliferation of non-synchronized networks, 
which contribute to the creation of a “new world order.”94 This 
phenomenon was attributed to three core factors: technological 
innovation that enables information exchange, the expansion of 
domestic regulation, and the rise of globalization.95 The international 
response to the surge in piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia and 
in the Gulf of Guinea exemplifies the scope of this phenomenon. 
Within a relatively short period of time, new institutions and 
structures were promptly created to address the new threats and 
specifically to facilitate the exchange of information. These included, 
for example, the creation of an operational network under the 
auspices of “The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction” (SHADE) 
initiative96 and the establishment of three information sharing centers 
under the Djibouti Code of Conduct.97 
The proliferation of new information sharing networks raises a 
number of challenges. First, it creates confusion as to which network 
should be used and which entity should be approached in a particular 
case. This problem is even more acute where the possessor of the 
information, who wants to share it, is not accustomed to 
communicating with entities from other disciplines—for example 
where a private shipping company wishes to communicate information 
to the navy or the police.  
In addition, the abundance of networks frequently leads to two 
extreme and problematic situations related to the circulation of an 
item of information. One extreme is a case where an item is circulated 
simultaneously in different networks, and consequently, users that are 
connected to these networks receive the exact same item multiple 
times. This duplication (or multiplication) of communication burdens 
the information system and its users, and it wastes valuable resources.  
 
94. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15 (2004). 
95. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 16 (2002). 
96. The SHADE initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed 
at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and 
coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of 
Aden and the western Indian Ocean. See generally Shared Awareness 
and Deconfliction (SHADE), OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, http:// 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-
shade (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (containing more information on 
SHADE). 
97. See Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra 56, art. 8(1) (describing the 
centers established in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen). 
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The opposite scenario is also quite common and is potentially 
even riskier: it concerns the situation where networks operate in “close 
circuit” and without coordination. This leads to valuable items of 
information being lost due to the silo-style structure of the networks. 
Such a situation can have harsh consequences where an item of 
information circulated in one network is the missing piece in the 
puzzle that entities connected to other networks are trying to put 
together. This shortcoming was underscored by Pierre St. Hilaire, 
Head of INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Taskforce: 
There is a large volume of information on piracy networks that 
is fragmented and in the possession of actors that have little 
past experience of working together closely. For example, 
information on piracy attacks and those responsible may be in 
the possession of the military; complementary information on 
the same attacks may be in the possession of the flag state, the 
ship owner, local law enforcement, crew members and hostages, 
and the private actors conducting the ransom negotiations.98  
Mr. St. Hilaire added, “[p]oor communication among ship owners, 
navies, and law enforcement agencies means that it has been difficult 
to develop complete pictures of what happens in pirate attacks.”99 
One suggested solution is to centralize the flow of information 
through the creation of a single information sharing mechanism.100 
This mechanism should be comprised of two layers. The first layer 
would be on the national level, where each country should designate a 
single point of contact to facilitate domestic inter-agency 
coordination,101 as well as communication with external stakeholders. 
Such designation of “central authorities” has become standard 
practice in matters concerning international cooperation in criminal 
matters,102 and it has been proven to be efficient in preventing 
 
98. St. Hilaire, supra note 73, at 3.  
99. Id. at 2 n.2. 
100. See id. at 3 (“The ultimate goal is to collect and centralize this 
information for use by the law enforcement community.”). 
101. On the importance of coordination on the domestic level, see generally 
Brian Wilson, Reshaping Maritime Security Cooperation: The 
Importance of Interagency Coordination at the National Level, in 
MODERN PIRACY: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, supra note 41, at 
202 (“In this context [of Somali piracy], cooperation between states is 
crucial. Recent efforts to repress piracy also demonstrate that 
cooperation within each state is equally crucial. Maritime security 
operations may involve extensive cooperation and coordination between 
different governmental agencies if they are to succeed.”). 
102. See supra notes 56, 57 and accompanying text (regarding the central 
information sharing centers discussed in the Djibouti and Gulf of Guinea 
Codes of Conduct). See also Article 32 of INTERPOL’s Constitution, 
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duplication of work, overcoming language barriers, and establishing 
informal personal relationships. Such informal personal relationships 
are often a key factor in facilitating effective and timely international 
cooperation. Along this line, Working Group 5, created in 
October 2011 under the auspices of the Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia and focused on the investigation of financial 
flows related to piracy,103 recommended “the adoption of a single point 
of contact in each country to strengthen the domestic coordination 
process and to facilitate liaison with the private sector.”104  
Similarly, on the second layer, namely on the international level, a 
single empowered international mechanism—a “one stop shop”—
should be identified. This mechanism need not be created based on 
hierarchical structure vis-à-vis states and other contributing entities; 
rather, it should serve as an end-point and coordinator of all 
information sharing operations. With regard to communication 
regarding financial flows, Working Group 5 identified INTERPOL as 
“the main international single point of contact with the shipping 
industry for information-sharing to boost the international 
community’s ability to identify, locate and prosecute pirates and their 
organizers and financiers.”105 
Where information centers and networks have already been 
created, and identifying a single point of contact among them is not 
feasible, consideration should be given to integrating their work 
through applying an interoperability paradigm, namely identifying 
 
according to which each member country appoints a body which will 
serve as the National Central Bureau (NCB). The NCB ensures liaison 
with: (1) the various departments in the country; (2) those bodies in 
other countries serving as National Central Bureaus; and (3) the 
Organization’s General Secretariat. See INTERPOL, supra note 85, 
art. 32. See also conventions adopted under the auspices of the U.N., 
where, for the purpose of ensuring coordinated cooperation (for example, 
with regard to executing requests for mutual legal assistance) the 
conventions require each state party to designate a central authority. 
See, e.g., Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 
18.13, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000). 
103. See Working Group 5, CGPCS, http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do? 
action=workAd (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (“Working Group 5, chaired 
by Italy, focuses on how to advance information sharing internationally 
and between industry and government authorities to disrupt the pirate 
enterprise ashore, and works with other key partners such as 
INTERPOL, national law enforcement/prosecution agencies currently 
pursuing piracy investigations/prosecution, and the World Bank to 
better understand how illicit financial flows associated with maritime 
piracy are moving in the area.”).  
104. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 2020, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. S/2012/783 (Oct. 22, 
2012). 
105. Id.  
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means to connect and synchronize the various existing networks, 
thereby creating a “network of networks.”106 From a technical 
perspective, this will ensure, for example, that a search in one system 
will generate responses from all other inter-connected networks and 
will therefore avoid the need to check each system individually.  
Finally, the already existing international and regional structures 
for sharing piracy-related information can generally provide adequate 
support and meet the needs for information exchange. Accordingly, 
prior to creating a new center or network in this field, it is 
recommended that states carefully assess the added value in such an 
undertaking and ensure that this would not in fact exacerbate the 
already existing problems discussed above. Indeed, this cautious 
approach was echoed in recent international instruments.107  
VI.  Conclusion 
Maritime piracy has posed considerable risks to the international 
community. A key component for successful counter-piracy 
undertakings is international cooperation among states, international 
and regional organizations, and the private sector. The legal basis for 
international cooperation is moored in various international 
instruments, as well as in general principles of international law. It 
requires states to adhere to due diligence “best efforts” standards, 
which, in the context of maritime piracy, entail exercising sincere, 
concerted and proactive efforts.   
Sharing information is one of the specific duties within the general 
duty to cooperate. It should therefore lead to a regular exchange of 
relevant data among all actors involved. Restrictions based on 
national security and classification rules should be applied only on an 
exceptional basis.  
The implementation of a strategic partnership based on an 
interdisciplinary paradigm is not without difficulties, particularly in 
the field of information exchange and in light of the fact that the 
 
106. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 94, at 135 (“The best way to integrate the 
various governments networks . . . into a more recognizable structure of 
world order is to create networks of networks.”). See also id. ch. 4, pt. 1 
(discussing this idea further).  
107. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2039, supra note 4, ¶ 7 (encouraging “the States of 
the Gulf of Guinea, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC, to develop and 
implement transnational and transregional maritime security 
coordination centres covering the whole region of the Gulf of Guinea, 
building on existing initiatives, such as those under the auspices of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)” (emphasis added)); Gulf of 
Guinea Code of Conduct, supra note 57, pmbl. (emphasizing “the 
importance of building on existing national, regional and extraregional 
initiatives to enhance maritime safety and security in the Gulf of 
Guinea” (emphasis added)). 
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primary actors—navies, law enforcement agencies, and the private 
sector—are not accustomed to working together. Nevertheless, 
through collaboration in recent years, many challenges have been 
successfully met, and solutions that have not been part of the 
traditional discourse in combating crimes were identified. To continue 
and build on those accomplishments, it is paramount to centralize the 
flow of information and to avoid the creation of new close-circuit 
information networks.  
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